

FitzPatrick, Natal and the Unification of South Africa

January 1981 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Sir Percy FitzPatrick, a name well-known to South Africans but not usually associated with the history of Natal. After all, the collection of wilderness adventures which were first published in 1907 under the title *Jock Of The Bushveld* were based on his experiences as a transport-rider between Barberton and what was then Lourenco Marques, while his later ventures into farming and land settlement were focussed upon the Harrismith district of the Orange Free State and, subsequently, upon the eastern Cape.¹ Moreover, FitzPatrick's political career, extending in various forms from the late 1880s until shortly before his death in 1931,² was played out almost entirely in the Transvaal, even though his role as member for Pretoria East in the first Union Parliament obliged him to spend a great deal of time in Cape Town between 1910 and his resignation from the House in 1920.

FitzPatrick's connections with Natal were undeniably tenuous. In 1884 he passed through Durban and Pietermaritzburg en route to Lydenburg, having abandoned the dull security of a desk-job at the Cape in expectation of adventure and fortune on the newly discovered gold fields of the eastern Transvaal.³ In 1899, during the Anglo-Boer War, his youngest brother George was killed in action at Willow Grange near Estcourt.⁴ It was an event which made FitzPatrick's subsequent train journey through the Natal battlefields to the first sitting of the National Convention at Durban in October 1908 a very poignant experience, particularly as it was undertaken in the company of Generals Botha and De la Rey, who were also members of the Transvaal delegation to that Convention.⁵ Yet it was at the time of unification that FitzPatrick's political objectives led him to play a small but noteworthy role during a crucial phase in Natal's history. The colony's hesitancy in throwing in its political lot with the other British possessions of the subcontinent and its initial preference for a federal association rather than a fully-fledged union, are already well-known aspects of that period.⁶ Little known is the part which FitzPatrick played in persuading English-speaking Natalians to overcome their misgivings about joining the Union and to face with equanimity the prospect of a South African Government which would almost certainly be led by an Afrikaner.

In the build-up towards the 1907 Transvaal election, which followed the granting of responsible government status to that British colony in 1906, FitzPatrick had campaigned vigorously but unsuccessfully to ensure that a pro-British majority would win the day.⁷ He was convinced that if the gold-rich Transvaal could be secured as a loyal power-base, the rest of southern Africa could then be unified and consolidated in perpetuity as an integral part of the British Empire in whose virtues he so implicitly believed. As a member of the Progressive Party in opposition to the *Het Volk* Government led by Botha and Smuts, he had subsequently done his best to consolidate

the Transvaal British and to attract the 'moderate' elements within the Afrikaner population into a more broadly-based political partnership resting upon the principle of 'equal rights' for all whites under the British flag.⁸ It was the same principle in pursuit of which he had earlier been such an outspoken leader of the Transvaal's aggrieved 'uitlander' community prior to the Anglo-Boer War,⁹ and to which he was to adhere throughout his political career.

But FitzPatrick's efforts to wrest the political initiative in the Transvaal from *Het Volk's* iron grasp had been to no avail. Despondent at the steady deterioration of the Progressive Opposition during the 1907 and 1908 parliamentary sessions, he nevertheless recognized that his objectives might yet be achieved through the movement, which was then gathering momentum, towards the creation of some form of 'closer union' in South Africa as a whole. He was hopeful that, although what he regarded as the crucial political struggle for control of the Transvaal had already been fought and lost, South Africa might yet be made safe for the Empire through the creation of a Union which would enshrine the all-important principle of 'equal rights', and through the subsequent attraction of immigrants in numbers sufficient to ensure for all time a British preponderance in the hitherto Afrikaner-dominated rural districts.¹⁰ FitzPatrick was well aware of the existence and enormity of the other 'racial' issue in southern Africa but for him the more immediate problem to be tackled was the issue of 'equal rights' for Boer and Briton under the Union Jack, and not the long-term need for an accord between black and white.¹¹

FitzPatrick's inclusion in the Transvaal delegation to the National Convention, at which a constitution was to be hammered out for the new South Africa, gave him the opportunity to work towards the realization of the kind of union which he had long envisaged.¹² He perceived that, in order to achieve his objective, it was necessary to ensure that 'equal rights' was recognized by all 'British' South Africans as the essential principle underlying any prospective Union, not least by the predominantly 'British' population of Natal whose incorporation into the Union was vital to the success of his plans. To that end, after the Transvaal Parliament was prorogued in August 1908 FitzPatrick undertook an opinion-sounding tour of the other three colonies, the only delegate to the Convention who took the trouble to do so.¹³ In Natal, where public opinion was still wavering on the issue of 'closer union', he met with a mixed response from those who had been delegated to represent the colony at the National Convention. According to the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, who arranged the meeting, W.B. Morcom, who represented Pietermaritzburg City in the Natal Legislative Assembly, 'listened but said little', while the prominent local politicians C.J. Smythe and T. Hyslop came out 'strongly for the British position in South Africa.' By contrast, the Natal Prime Minister and member for Weenen County, F.R. Moor, was 'all for trusting the Dutch' and E.M. Greene, the Lion's River representative in the Legislative Assembly, 'rather stupidly treated FitzPatrick as representing opposing interests instead of as endeavouring to see how the Transvaal British & Natal's delegates could best work together'.¹⁴ FitzPatrick nevertheless made it clear that he fully appreciated 'the importance of the role that very British Durban may play in United South Africa' and that it was essential to protect

that port's interests in competition with Delagoa Bay for the lucrative Witwatersrand rail traffic.¹⁵ In so doing he effectively counteracted the erroneous belief held in some 'closer union' quarters that he was really a 'little Transvaler' who wanted that colony to 'make itself absolutely independent of the rest of South Africa by sending its trade to Delagoa', so that it could then 'dictate the terms of Union to the other colonies on their knees'.¹⁶

The sincerity of FitzPatrick's assurances to Natal's representatives is evident from the manner in which he pleaded with the other members of the Transvaal delegation to the National Convention not to drive 'too hard a bargain' with regard to the allocation of rail traffic to Delagoa Bay. During their discussions immediately prior to the Convention, FitzPatrick successfully warned his fellow-Transvalers of the need to achieve a 'reasonable settlement' between Delagoa and South Africa's own ports with regard to rail traffic and railway rates, lest they lost Natal's 'valuable support' for the cause of 'closer union' and for Pretoria's claim to be the seat of government.¹⁷ Much to his delight, the agreements which subsequently emerged from the Convention's deliberations with regard to finance, railways and harbours incorporated virtually all the major proposals put forward by the Transvaal delegation, whose unanimity of opinion he had helped to fashion, and satisfied his own concern for the establishment of a centrally administered, cheap system of transport which would ultimately benefit the nation as a whole instead of merely the interests of Delagoa-orientated 'little Transvalers'.¹⁸

Unfortunately FitzPatrick's sense of satisfaction with the draft constitution formulated by the National Convention was not shared by Natal's political leaders, even though he had done much to dispel their fear of compulsory bilingualism by persuading its chief proponent, General Hertzog, to accept the principle of equal recognition for English and Dutch as official languages without any obligation upon anybody, including civil servants, to acquire a command of both.¹⁹ There remained, in Natal, a persistent suspicion that the colony was not acquiring the best possible deal with regard to rail traffic and that 'closer union' with the rest of the subcontinent involved more disadvantages than benefits.²⁰ FitzPatrick's contribution to the 'closer union' cause in Natal consisted of three further visits to that colony during the crucial months immediately preceding its Referendum on the subject in June 1909.

In February of that year he and Lady FitzPatrick arrived in Natal, ostensibly to recover from a recent bout of ill-health, though the weather could hardly have been conducive to that purpose and, as the anti-union *Natal Witness* accurately surmised, it was really to promote 'the whole creed of the Convention'.²¹ The *Witness* went on to declare that 'we in Natal are in no need of stump orators from the adjoining Colonies', being 'capable of grasping the full meaning of the Constitution without the interference of outsiders, who, be it said, have less desire to educate us than to win us over to their own preconceived ideas.' The *Witness* also made much of the fact that, whereas 'a short time ago Sir Percy was reiterating warnings in the Assembly at Pretoria as to the fate of the British section under Dutch dominance,' he was now not only advocating 'Union on principle' but was urging 'the particular form of Union which will give the at present governing

classes in the Transvaal the preponderance of power for many years to come.' It therefore cautioned its readers that 'the politics of such men are, and always will be, of the most material character', being but 'the mouthpieces and representatives of Capital' for whom 'so long as the commercial interests of the Rand capitalist are safe-guarded very little else matters'. Such editorial sentiments doubtless appealed to the many 'little Natalians' in and around Pietermaritzburg who were so strongly opposed to 'closer union', but they were a distortion of FitzPatrick's real political objectives and conveniently ignored the fact that he had long since severed his personal connections with the Rand mining industry.²² The attitude expressed by the *Witness* also seemed to confirm Sir Matthew Nathan's warning to the British High Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Selborne, that Maritzburg was 'wholly against' the National Convention's draft constitution, with 'the country about equally divided', and that the fate of the pro-union cause in the colony therefore rested with the voters of Durban who, if not guaranteed an acceptable share of the interior rail traffic, would also prove 'hostile'.²³

That may have been the reason why, after passing through Pietermaritzburg where they were entertained at Government House, the FitzPatricks made straight for Durban where, on 25th February, they were on the platform when Prime Minister Moor addressed a 3 000-strong meeting in the Town Hall on the subject of the Convention and the draft constitution which it had produced.²⁴ At the end of what he later described as 'a splendid meeting' in which Moor 'could have marched on to victory but did not know what to do with his opportunity', having been subjected to 'a pretty hostile reception' in Pietermaritzburg three days earlier,²⁵ FitzPatrick responded to 'repeated calls' for him to speak by merely making 'a few humorous remarks' and diplomatically referring to the impressive performance of the Natal delegation at the Convention.²⁶ The temptation to say more must have been strong, for the 1907 Transvaal election campaign had demonstrated that he was a fearless platform-speaker, who enjoyed nothing more than overcoming the challenge posed by a doubtful or even hostile audience. Moreover, the successful incorporation of Natal into the imminent Union was clearly vital to his political strategy and he privately regretted the absence of any 'note of confidence' in Moor's speeches when the situation demanded 'a more resolute line'.²⁷

Nevertheless, FitzPatrick did not address any other public meetings during the course of that visit, as the local pro-union lobby had decided that he should 'not make a false step by cutting in too soon'.²⁸ Instead, he contented himself with consulting 'all the leading men' in Durban and accepted an invitation to hold joint discussions with 'the executives of five different political bodies'. He took the precaution of asking for the local newspaper editors to be present so that Gustav Hallé, editor of the *Natal Mercantile Advertiser*, would not be able to publish 'a poisonous account of it all', for he was known to be as staunchly anti-unionist as Peter Davis, the proprietor of both the *Advertiser* and the *Witness*.²⁹ Brief though it was, FitzPatrick's visit to Natal re-assured him that many of those opposed to unification were 'not unconvertible' and, by the time he returned to the Transvaal on 28th February, he had already undertaken to return to the colony in the near future.³⁰



Sir Percy FitzPatrick in middle age.

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By 21st March 1909, when he honoured that promise, there were reports that public opinion in Natal was swinging in favour of the draft constitution and that a majority of Legislative Assembly members had already declared their support for it.³¹ But FitzPatrick was concerned that the colony's pro-union faction still appeared to be so easily 'put off by a few violent and ignorant constituents' and that its faint-hearted leadership was 'still funk' Maritzburg and finding heaps of plausible excuses for avoiding a fight' with what he considered to be the town's 'violent parochial gang' which was so vigorously opposed to their cause. 'Fighting Fitz', as he was popularly known in the Transvaal, was therefore initially determined to promote the 'assault' on the colony's capital where, in his view, 'the windbag blusterers

and bullies' had been allowed to monopolize the political scene for too long.³² But, once again, he was prevailed upon not to make any premature public utterances. After being warned about the extent of local resentment towards 'outside influence', as well as the 'great suspicion of the Rand and talk of magnate influences', he reconciled himself to 'playing second fiddle' to the local pro-unionists, speaking only on the current political situation in the Transvaal and on the 'racial' issue between Boer and Briton in its broadest dimensions.³³

On arrival in Pietermaritzburg, where he was again a guest at Government House, FitzPatrick's visit aroused much 'comment and curiosity' even though he did not address any public meetings and, as the *Witness* conceded, proceeded to sound out public opinion on the draft constitution 'in an unobtrusive sort of way'.³⁴ He did speak at two important private functions, the first being a gathering of the local Constitution Amendment Association which was convened at his own request and the second, to which he was invited, being a meeting attended by members of both the Town Council and the Chamber of Commerce in the local Town Hall. According to information supplied to the *Natal Witness*, which criticized the private nature of his visit on the grounds that the colony at large should have been allowed to hear whatever he had to say, the essence of FitzPatrick's address at the second meeting was an appeal for trust in the various safeguards which had been provided by the draft constitution. On that basis he apparently rejected all the locally favoured amendments to that agreement as being 'unnecessary', denied the rumour that the Transvaal sought to annex parts of northern Natal by taking advantage of a provision in the draft constitution pertaining to the adjustment of provincial boundaries, and indicated that the Transvaal favoured Natal's inclusion in the proposed Union in order to 'counteract any undue influence from the Cape.' While the *Witness* re-assured itself, if not its readers, that he had 'made no converts in Maritzburg', FitzPatrick held a similar private meeting in Durban before returning to the Transvaal, where he found it necessary to deny rumours that he intended to contest a Durban seat in the first Union election.³⁵

FitzPatrick's final pro-union visit to Natal was confined to the northern districts of the colony and took place immediately prior to her Referendum of 10th June, at the invitation of the local branches of the Closer Union Society.³⁶ In the interim since his most recent visit in March, the Natal Parliament had completed its agonizing deliberations on the draft constitution,³⁷ so that he was at last able to address himself to the general public without provoking accusations of attempting to interfere with the colony's due political process. At his first such meeting, held on 7th June in the Newcastle Town Hall, he offered three reasons why Natal should not delay in joining the Union.³⁸ He argued firstly that, as the existing customs union agreement had been found to be unworkable, it would not be allowed to continue; secondly, that in the coming year the Transvaal's rosy financial position would be even further enhanced and its inhabitants therefore unlikely to agree to those terms which were currently being offered and, thirdly, that South African unification was vital in the interests of 'common defence'. FitzPatrick conceded that if Natal stood out of the Union it would have the undesirable effect of upsetting the existing equilibrium between

Boer and Briton, but he insisted that there would still be no possibility of the Transvaal breaking faith with her other prospective partners and that Natal's own future material prosperity would be 'dearly bought from a policy of isolation'. She would, he insisted, have to contend with a consequent decline in trade, employment and investment which would ultimately affect railwaymen and civil servants just as much as those involved in the commercial and agricultural sectors of the colony's economy.

With regard to the thorny question of rail traffic, FitzPatrick appealed to his audience to recognize that the trade involved still belonged to the inhabitants of the Transvaal, who were entitled to 'go to their nearest port' if they so pleased but that the essential point, '30 per cent of the trade for Natal', had already been firmly secured.³⁹ He expressed surprise at the 'state of funk' which had been generated in connection with the so-called 'racial' issue, pointing out that in future it would be 'impossible to form a Dutch racial or British racial party in South Africa with a majority' as any government would henceforth need to 'draw largely from the other race' in order to ensure for itself 'a workable majority.' He similarly dismissed the prevailing fear that civil servants in Natal would lose their positions after Union, arguing that the new constitution clearly stipulated that 'no man shall lose his place by reason of not knowing either language'.⁴⁰

The *Natal Witness*, which otherwise gave scant coverage to FitzPatrick's third visit to the colony in a matter of months, criticized the pro-unionists for importing him to 'charm the birds from the trees in our northern districts.' It conceded that he was 'a pleasant writer' with 'a persuasive tongue' but insisted that his political career had thus far been 'that of a stormy petrel, rather than that of a peace maker', as his involvement in public events prior to the Anglo-Boer War had proved. The *Witness* nevertheless expressed unconvincing confidence that, just as FitzPatrick had earlier failed to win 'converts' in Pietermaritzburg, so the colony's 'townsmen in the north' would not prove to be 'the simple bucholic (sic) folk the Closer Union Society take them for' and would 'not be caught like the Rand Reformers of 1895-1896, by genial speech and fair phrases — to their ultimate sorrow and undoing'.⁴¹

FitzPatrick's whirlwind tour of the northern districts continued unabated. Four subsequent speeches followed much the same pattern as his initial address at Newcastle. On 8th June, at a large afternoon gathering of coal-miners and farmers at St. George's Colliery near Dundee, he reiterated his belief that 'race domination' would be impossible under Union, pointing out that the performance of the Transvaal's 'Dutch Government' with its two-to-one majority was an indication that it would not even be attempted.⁴² That evening, in the Dundee Public Hall, he cautioned that only the Transvaal could 'look with equanimity upon separation', whereas Natal would be particularly hard-hit by 'isolation'.⁴³ It was an argument which he repeated the following afternoon at the Elandslaagte Colliery, where a gathering of coal-miners declared themselves to be 'solid for union'.⁴⁴ In the evening, at what was described as the biggest meeting thus far held in the Ladysmith Town Hall, FitzPatrick stressed the strong 'community of interest' which the Transvaal and northern Natal needed to recognize in the mutual benefits to be derived from a cheap and efficient railway system. In reply to a speech by

the prominent anti-unionist F.S. Tatham, who argued that Natal would later be able to join the Union 'on her own terms' if she remained initially aloof, FitzPatrick appealed to the town's historical associations by concluding: 'The dead lie thick around you . . . does it not call upon you to take a larger view of things than the opponents of the draft Act are asking you to take?'⁴⁵

In the Referendum which took place the following day, three-quarters of the votes cast were in favour of the draft constitution and the pro-unionists won a clear majority in every constituency, including that hot-bed of resistance, Pietermaritzburg.⁴⁶ Although only 43.7 per cent of the colony's electorate had actually voted in favour of Union in a low percentage poll of 58.2, the outcome of Natal's Referendum must have been a source of considerable satisfaction to FitzPatrick. Yet it remains impossible to determine precisely to what extent his efforts and those of fellow-Transvaler Richard Feetham, who also addressed pro-union meetings in Natal,⁴⁷ materially influenced the result. What is certain is that, by giving moral support to Natal's pro-union leaders in the face of vociferous opposition, by private lobbying in Durban and Pietermaritzburg at a time when public opinion was wavering and, finally, by addressing open meetings in the northern districts of the colony on the very eve of the Referendum, FitzPatrick did make a contribution to the outcome which is worthy of recognition.

It was a contribution of which he was subsequently very conscious, after his own optimistic expectations about the future in a united South Africa had been blunted by the failure of the 'fresh start' negotiations between Botha and the Unionist Party leader Jameson,⁴⁸ and after his own *plea for a fresh start* had been rejected through Botha's personal attempt to squeeze him out of politics by unsuccessfully standing against him in the Pretoria East constituency at the time of the first Union election.⁴⁹ On more than one occasion in the House of Assembly, when he detected efforts by the Botha Government to impose compulsory bilingualism on the public service, FitzPatrick pointed out that none of the existing colonial civil services had been warned of that possibility at the time of Union and that, unhappily, he had himself given assurances to the contrary in an effort 'to induce the people of Natal to support Union'.⁵⁰ The language issue featured prominently when, in June 1912, FitzPatrick again visited Natal, on that occasion to speak in support of the Unionist candidate, B.W. Greenacre, in a Greyville by-election contest against Tommy Boydell of the Labour Party. That mission did not enjoy the success of his pro-union efforts of 1909, ending in a narrow but disappointing defeat at the hands of the strengthening Labour Party.⁵¹

Yet, for all his disappointment at the outcome of events during and immediately after unification, FitzPatrick did have the satisfaction of witnessing a re-alignment of political forces in South Africa when the crisis of the First World War, and the bitter dissensions which South African involvement in that conflict provoked among Afrikaners, brought Botha's Government and the Unionist Opposition closer together in support of the imperial war effort.⁵² It was a relationship which only vaguely approached that envisaged in his *plea for a fresh start* at the time of Union, but the subsequent fusion of Unionists and 'moderate' Afrikaners which took place

towards the end of 1920 under the leadership of Smuts⁵³ represented the culmination of FitzPatrick's own unflagging efforts towards a fresh 'non-racial' start for the whole of South Africa, including Natal.

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- ⁶ See L.M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910*, Oxford, 1960, pp. 41-49, 165-171, 348-362.
- ⁷ Guest, 'FitzPatrick, 1907-1920', pp. 1-99.
- ⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 100-193. For an expression of his political objectives at that time, see C.O. 879/93/851: FitzPatrick, undated Memoranda (1906); Milner Papers, S.A. 10 & 11 and dep 218: FitzPatrick to J. Wernher, 19th February and 7th May 1906 (Copies), FitzPatrick to Milner, 11th January and 11th November 1907; FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV, A/LB VII and A/LC IV, V, VII & VIII: FitzPatrick to J. St. Leger, 12th March 1907, FitzPatrick to Milner, 1st April, 15th August, 28th October 1907, 28th June 1908, FitzPatrick to Wernher 10th June, 28th July, 3rd & 10th August, 2nd December 1907, 24th January & 10th August 1908.
- ⁹ See Duminy, 'FitzPatrick, 1895-1906.'
- ¹⁰ FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VII & VIII: FitzPatrick to Milner, 28th June 1908, FitzPatrick to Wernher, 10th August 1908.
- ¹¹ See, for example, the reports on FitzPatrick's comments in that connection in the *Transvaal Leader* and the *Star*, 18th November 1907, the *Progressive Monthly*, May 1908, pp. 589-594, and *South Africa*, 31st July 1909.
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- ¹⁴ Selborne Papers, Ms 56: Nathan to Selborne, 4th September 1908.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*. See also FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII: FitzPatrick to Nathan, 21st September 1908 and Sir Matthew Nathan Papers, Ms 393: Nathan to FitzPatrick, 29th September 1908 (Copy).
- ¹⁶ Milner Papers, S.A. 11: Curtis to Milner, 29th September 1906.
- ¹⁷ FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII & A/MSS VII: FitzPatrick to D. Chaplin, 7th October 1908 and FitzPatrick 'Equal Rights' in *Scraps of History* (undated typescript); Selborne Papers, Ms 62: FitzPatrick to Selborne, 9th October 1908, enclosing a 'Memorandum on Trade Routes And Traffic Shares.'
- ¹⁸ Thompson, *Unification*, pp. 288-294; Selborne Papers, Ms 62: FitzPatrick to Selborne, 9th October 1908, enclosing a 'Memorandum on the Special Need of Cheap Transport.'
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- ³⁵ Ibid; the *Natal Mercury*, 25th and 29th March 1909. Reports.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 4th June 1909. Report.
- ³⁷ Thompson, *Unification*, pp. 348-362.
- ³⁸ The *Transvaal Leader* and the *Natal Mercury*, 8th June 1909. Reports.
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- ⁴⁶ Thompson, *Unification*, p. 396.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 395.
- ⁴⁸ See the *Transvaal Leader* and the *Star*, 12th February 1910. Reports on Jameson's speech in Cape Town on 11th February 1910. See also Thompson, *Unification*, pp. 441-442.
- ⁴⁹ See J.P. FitzPatrick, *The Union: A plea for a fresh start*, translated as *Een Pleidooi voor een Nieuw Begin*, Johannesburg, 1910. See also Guest, 'FitzPatrick, 1907-1920', pp. 276-313.
- ⁵⁰ See, for example, *Union House of Assembly Debates*, 1912, cols 3853-3857, 20th June 1912; the *Star*, 21st June 1912. Report.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, 25th, 27th 28th and 29th June 1912. Reports; FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II: FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 6th, 22nd and 25th June 1912; Chaplin Papers, Reel 5: T. Smartt to Chaplin, 6th July 1912.
- ⁵² Guest, 'FitzPatrick, 1907-1920' pp. 419-422, 431-444.
- ⁵³ FitzPatrick Papers, B/A VIII & IX: J. Hennessy to FitzPatrick, 18th October 1920, Smuts to FitzPatrick, 26th November 1920 and 21st February 1921; Duncan Papers, A1.79: Hennessy to Duncan, 19th October 1920; Milner Papers, deps 48 and 199: Smartt to Milner, 25th February 1921 and FitzPatrick to Milner, 28th August 1922; Smuts Papers, Vol 23 No 81: FitzPatrick to Smuts, 22nd November 1920.

NOTES

- ¹ The Sir F.D.P. *Chaplin Papers* are housed in the National Archives Salisbury, Zimbabwe and were consulted on microfilm in the University of the Witwatersrand Library.
- ² The C.O. (*Colonial Office*) Confidential Print Records are housed in the Public Records Office, London and are also available on microfilm in the History Dept, University of Natal, Durban.
- ³ The Sir Patrick *Duncan Papers* are housed in the Jagger Library, University of Cape Town.
- ⁴ The Sir J. Percy *FitzPatrick Papers* are housed in the National English Literary Museum, Grahamstown.
- ⁵ The Sir Alfred *Milner Papers* are housed in the Bodleian Library, Oxford and photocopies are available in the Government Archives, Pretoria.
- ⁶ The Sir Matthew *Nathan Papers* are housed in the Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
- ⁷ The Lord *Selborne Papers* are housed in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
- ⁸ The *Smuts Papers* are housed in the Government Archives, Pretoria and in the Jagger Library, University of Cape Town.